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Beyond International Commercial Arbitration?  
The Promise of International Commercial Mediation 
S.I. Strong

 
I. INTRODUCTION 
International commercial arbitration has long been the preferred 
means of resolving complex business disputes in the cross-border 
context.
1
 However, the international corporate community has 
become somewhat disenchanted with that particular mechanism 
because of concerns about rising costs, delays, and procedural 
formality.
2
 As a result, parties are looking for other means of 
resolving international commercial disputes. One of the more popular 
alternatives is mediation.
3
  
 
   Ph.D. (law), University of Cambridge; D.Phil., University of Oxford; J.D., Duke 
University; M.P.W., University of Southern California; B.A., University of California, Davis. 
The author, who is admitted to practice as an attorney in New York and Illinois and as a 
solicitor in England and Wales, is Associate Professor of Law at the University of Missouri and 
Senior Fellow at the Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution. The author would like to thank 
the participants at the “New Directions in Global Negotiation & Dispute Resolution” 
Scholarship Roundtable, in conjunction with the Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute, at 
Washington University Law School, for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. All 
errors of course remain the author’s own. 
 1. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 68 (2009). 
 2. See WILLIAM W. PARK, ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES: 
STUDIES IN LAW AND PRACTICE 3–27 (2d. ed. 2012); S.I. Strong, Increasing Legalism in 
International Commercial Arbitration: A New Theory of Causes, A New Approach to Cures, 7 
WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 117, 117–18 (2013) [hereinafter Strong, Increasing 
Legalism]. 
 3. See Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation: The “New Arbitration,” 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. 61, 66–67 (2012) [hereinafter Nolan-Haley, Mediation]. International commercial 
mediation can arise either through the use of standalone agreements or multitiered (step) dispute 
resolution provisions created either before or after the dispute arises. See Neil Andrews, 
Connections between Courts, Arbitration, Mediation and Settlement: Transnational 
Observations, 10 IUS GENTIUM 249, 264 (2012); Paul E. Mason, What’s Brewing in the 
International Commercial Mediation Process: Differences from Domestic Mediation and Other 
Things Parties, Counsel and Mediators Should Know, 66 DISP. RESOL. J. 64, 66 (Feb.–Apr. 
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Although the number of recent developments in the field may 
make international commercial mediation sound as if it is a novel 
concept, the idea of using consensus-based mechanisms to resolve 
transnational business disputes is not new.
4
 In fact, mediation and 
conciliation
5
 were often the preferred means of resolving 
international commercial conflicts in the first half of the twentieth 
century.
6
 It was only in the years following World War II that 
arbitration became the more popular method of addressing cross-
border business disputes.
7
  
The reason for this shift in emphasis is unclear, since institutional 
support for consensus-based dispute resolution remained in effect 
throughout the twentieth and early twenty-first century. For example, 
 
2011). International commercial mediation could also arise as the result of a court-mandated 
mediation program. See id.  
 4. See Harold I. Abramson, Time to Try Mediation of International Commercial 
Disputes, 4 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 323, 323 (1998); Steven J. Burton, Combining 
Conciliation with Arbitration of International Commercial Disputes, 18 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 637, 637 (1995).  
 5. There has been a great deal of debate over the years about the difference between the 
terms “mediation” and “conciliation.” See Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Is Europe Headed Down 
the Primrose Path with Mandatory Mediation?, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 981, 1009–10 
(2012); Anna Spain, Integration Matters: Rethinking the Architecture of International Dispute 
Resolution, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 10–11 (2010); Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea Kupfer 
Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation Into Bilateral Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, 18 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71, 84–85 (2013). Both conciliation and mediation can 
take place in the context of public international (state-to-state) disputes and private international 
disputes. See Linda C. Reif, Conciliation as a Mechanism for the Resolution of International 
Economic and Business Disputes, 14 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 578, 582–83 (1991). Although some 
experts identify certain differences in the procedural processes used by the third party neutral, 
with conciliation being more evaluative than “pure” mediation, most people have now 
concluded the two terms are basically synonymous. See UNITED NATIONS, UNCITRAL MODEL 
LAW ON INT’L COMMERCIAL CONCILIATION WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT & USE 11 (2004), 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-conc/03-90953_Ebook.pdf 
[hereinafter UNCITRAL GUIDE]; Thomas Gaultier, Cross-Border Mediation: A New Solution 
for International Commercial Settlement?, 26 INT’L L. PRACTICUM 38, 42 n.25 (2013); Howard 
M. Holtzmann, Recent Work on Dispute Resolution by the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law, 5 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 425, 426 (1999); Nolan-Haley, supra, at 
1009–10. That is the approach that will be adopted herein. However, the debate continues, and 
some people may be hesitant to adopt conciliation, even if they are in favor of mediation. 
 6. See Eric A. Schwartz, International Conciliation and the ICC, 10 ICSID REV.—
FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 98, 99 (1995). 
 7. See Reif, supra note 5, at 614–15; Schwartz, supra note 6, at 99, 107 (noting fewer 
than fifty-five requests for conciliation or mediation with the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) from 1988 to 1994, as compared to over 2,000 requests for ICC arbitration). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol45/iss1/7
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one of the world’s leading private dispute resolution providers, the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), has had rules on 
international commercial conciliation and mediation continuously in 
place since 1923, with the most recent version having gone into effect 
on January 1, 2014.
8
 The United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
9
 has had its own set of rules 
in place since 1980 (“UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules”),
10
 although 
those provisions have not been adopted by private parties nearly as 
often as UNCITRAL’s rules on international commercial arbitration 
(“UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules”) have.
11
 Thus, the preference for 
arbitration cannot be the result of a lack of institutional or structural 
support, at least at the level of individual disputes. 
However, there may be larger factors at play. For example, 
international commercial arbitration has undoubtedly benefitted from 
the extensive system of international treaties designed to promote 
international commercial arbitration in the years following World 
War II.
12
 International commercial mediation, on the other hand, has 
 
 8. See generally INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MEDIATION RULES (in effect Jan. 1, 
2014), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-adr/arbitration/ 
icc-rules-of-arbitration/; Reif, supra note 5, at 614–15; Schwartz, supra note 6, at 99.  
 9. UNCITRAL was created to promote the harmonization of international commercial 
and trade law so as to encourage international commercial activity. See Establishment of the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, G.A. Res. 2205 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 
6th Comm., 21st Sess., 1497th plen. mtg. (Dec. 17, 1966).  
 10. See Conciliation Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade, 
U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., 81st plen. mtg. at 260, U.N. Doc. A/35/52 (Dec.4, 1980), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/conc-rules/conc-rules-e.pdf [hereinafter 
UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules]; Ellen E. Deason, Procedural Rules for Complementary 
Systems of Litigation and Mediation—Worldwide, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 553, 572 n.90 
(2005). Although the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules have not been widely adopted by private 
parties, the rules have been critically well received and have formed the basis of a number of 
different institutional rules on mediation and conciliation. See Holtzmann, supra note 5, at 425–
26; William K. Slate II et al., UNCITRAL (United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law), Its Workings in International Arbitration and a New Model Conciliation Law, 6 
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 73, 94 (2004).  
 11. UNCITRAL initially promulgated its arbitration rules in 1976 but revised them in 
2010. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, UNCITRAL, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 
17 at 34, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (Apr. 28, 1976), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/ 
texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 1976]; 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 65/22, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/22 (Jan. 10, 2011), 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-
revised-2010-e.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010].  
 12. See infra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.  
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primarily existed as a form of “soft law.”
13
 Another issue may be a 
cultural predisposition towards adjudicative means of dispute 
resolution, at least in Western legal systems.
14
 While many scholars 
may prefer consensus-based methods of dispute resolution, there may 
be something about international commercial disputes that leads 
parties and practitioners to prefer arbitration.
15
  
In any event, the issue is now back at the forefront of scholarly 
and practical debate.
16
 Empirical studies have suggested an uptick in 
commercial actors’ commitment to consensual forms of dispute 
resolution,
17
 which may signify a more serious indicator of potential 
change. The World Bank, in conjunction with the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), is attempting to promote international 
commercial mediation, while courts in some jurisdictions have taken 
 
 13. See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional 
Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 594–99, 624–25 (2008); Andrew Guzman & Timothy L. 
Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 222 (2010).  
 14. See Gavan Griffith & Andrew D. Mitchell, Contractual Dispute Resolution in 
International Trade: The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976) and the UNCITRAL 
Conciliation Rules (1980), 3 MELB. J. INT’L L. 184, 186–87 (2002); see also Abramson, supra 
note 4, at 323; Julie Barker, International Mediation—A Better Alternative for the Resolution of 
Commercial Disputes: Guidelines for a U.S. Negotiator Involved in an International 
Commercial Mediation with Mexicans, 19 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1, 8–9 (1996); Cymie 
Payne, International Arbitration, 90 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 244, 253 (Mar. 27–30, 1996). 
 15. See Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It’s Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology, 
2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 81, 83. 
 16. See Andrews, supra note 3, at 249; John M. Barkett, Avoiding the Costs of 
International Commercial Arbitration: Is Mediation the Solution?, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 
IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2010, 359, 364 
(Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2010); Deason, supra note 10, at 572–91; Gaultier, supra note 5, at 38; 
William A. Herbert et al., International Commercial Mediation, 45 INT’L LAW. 111, 111–23 
(2011); Mason, supra note 3, at 66–70; Nolan-Haley, Mediation, supra note 3, at 66–67; Jernej 
Sekolec & Michael B. Getty, The UMA and the UNICTRAL Model Rule: An Emerging 
Consensus on Mediation and Conciliation, 2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 175 (comparing the 
UNCITRAL Model Conciliation Law and the Uniform Mediation Act); Eric van Ginkel, The 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation: A Critical Appraisal, 21 J. 
INT’L ARB. 1, 1–65 (2004); Welsh & Schneider, supra note 5, at 77–78.  
 17. However, these studies concentrate primarily on domestic disputes. See John Lande, 
Getting the Faith: Why Business Lawyers and Executives Believe in Mediation, 5 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 137, 161–65 (2000); Thomas J. Stipanowich & J. Ryan Lamare, Living with 
ADR: Evolving Perceptions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration and Conflict Management in 
Fortune 1,000 Companies, HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=2221471. Indeed, one of those studies noted that arbitration was far more likely to 
be chosen in cases involving international disputes, and specifically excluded international 
disputes from the conclusions of the study. See id. at *11 n.98, *36–37 n.237. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol45/iss1/7
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an increasingly strict view of the parties’ obligation to mediate.
18
 A 
number of well-respected multinational corporations,
19
 most notably 
General Electric
20
 and Siemens,
21
 have advocated early dispute 
resolution strategies that include mediation.  
While these initiatives suggest that consensus-based dispute 
resolution mechanisms are becoming increasingly institutionalized,
22
 
some potential difficulties nevertheless remain.
23
 One area of concern 
arises out of the fact that the current interest in international 
commercial mediation appears to be based on the presumption that 
mediation will be faster, easier, and less expensive than other forms 
of international dispute resolution, including international 
commercial arbitration.
24
 However, it is unclear whether and to what 
extent this presumption is defensible.
25
 For example, some empirical 
research suggests that mediation actually decreases client costs in 
 
 18. See PGF II SA v. OMFS Co. 1 Ltd., [2013] EWCA (Civ) 1288 [1, 54–55] (Briggs, 
L.J.), [2013] W.L.R. (D) 405 (CA) (Eng.) (denying costs to a party because of its “unreasonable 
refusal to recognize a request to mediate”). 
 19. Over 4,000 domestic and international corporations have signed the CPR Corporate 
Policy Statement on Litigation, which advocates alternative means of dispute resolution. See 
Corporate Pledge, INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL., http://www.cpradr.org/ 
About/ADRPledges/CorporatePledgeSigners.aspx?page1839=14 (last visited Feb. 23, 2014). 
 20. See MICHAEL A. WHEELER & GILLIAN MORRIS, GE’S EARLY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
INITIATIVE (A), HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL 2–4 (June 19, 2001) (discussing General 
Electric’s domestic dispute resolution strategy, based on the Six Sigma approach); MICHAEL A. 
WHEELER & GILLIAN MORRIS, GE’S EARLY DISPUTE RESOLUTION INITIATIVE (B), HARVARD 
BUSINESS SCHOOL SUPP. 801-453 (June 2001) [hereinafter WHEELER & MORRIS, 
INTERNATIONAL] (discussing the internationalization of General Electric’s dispute resolution 
strategy). 
 21. See Walter G. Gans & David Stryker, ADR: The Siemens’ Experience, 51 DISP. 
RESOL. J. 40, 41 (Apr.–Sept. 1996) (discussing cultural influence of German parent company). 
 22. See CYRIL CHERN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL MEDIATION 29 (2008); see also 
Lande, supra note 17, at 216–17 (discussing the benefits of “institutionalizing” new practices). 
 23. For example, not all jurisdictions view mediation in the same light. See WHEELER & 
MORRIS, INTERNATIONAL, supra note 20, at 4 (noting early dispute resolution techniques 
developed in the United States do not necessarily apply outside the United States). 
 24. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.  
 25. Studies regarding corporate interest in mediation do not appear to have provided 
subjects with statistical evidence on the actual cost and success rate of commercial mediation 
and instead focus on participants’ perceptions of mediation processes. See Lande, supra note 
17, at 165; Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 17, at *10 (discussing “perceptions that 
mediation offered potential cost and time savings,” but providing no hard data on the scope and 
nature of the alleged savings of time and money). But see Lande, supra note 17, at 177–79 
(discussing participants’ personal experiences with ADR). Furthermore, these studies were 
primarily conducted in domestic settings. See supra note 17. 
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only about half of the disputes in which it is used.
26
 Savings of time 
and money may be even less likely to occur in international 
commercial matters, where there is a tendency for counsel to conduct 
mediations like “mini arbitrations.”
27
  
Therefore, the question arises as to whether and to what extent 
international commercial mediation can serve as an adequate 
substitute for international commercial arbitration and, in particular, 
whether it can live up to the promise of delivering quick, 
inexpensive, and informal dispute resolution. To answer that 
question, this Article focuses on three separate issues. First, the 
discussion considers the unique characteristics of international 
commercial disputes to determine whether such matters are amenable 
to mediation. Second, the Article determines what incentives to use 
international commercial mediation might exist if savings of time, 
cost, and procedural formality are taken out of the equation. Third, 
the analysis describes how public international law might be used to 
support the development of international commercial mediation.  
II. THE UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES  
Experts agree that not every dispute is suitable for mediation.
28
 
However, mediation may be appropriate when  
(1) there is potential for preserving an ongoing relationship, 
(2) the main issue is determining damages and there is not a 
 
 26. See Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We 
Know from Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 641, 672 (2002); see also 
Lande, supra note 17, at 186. But see Schwartz, supra note 6, at 108–10 (discussing costs of 
ICC conciliation versus ICC arbitration).  
 27. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 112 (noting commercial mediations can be highly 
legalistic); see also supra note 2 and accompanying text. This trend towards increased formality 
may arise over time, as a particular dispute resolution process becomes more mature. See 
Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitration, 74 TUL. 
L. REV. 39, 40–41 (1999). 
 28. See Barry Edwards, Renovating the Multi-Door Courthouse: Designing Trial Court 
Dispute Resolution Systems to Improve Results and Control Costs, 18 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 
281, 295–303 (2013); Nolan-Haley, Mediation, supra note 3, at 63–64; see also INT’L INST. FOR 
CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOLUTION (CPR), ADR SUITABILITY GUIDE (2001), available at 
http://www.cpradr.org/Portals/0/Resources/ADR%20Tools/Tools/cpr%20suitability%20guide. 
pdf. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol45/iss1/7
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critical dispute about liability or an issue of principle, (3) there 
is not a need for legal precedent (such as an early case in a set 
of related claims that would be relevant to later cases), 
(4) there is a lot at stake, (5) it makes sense to settle for less 
than the cost of defense, (6) the case is complex, especially if it 
involves technical expertise, (7) the case needs a creative 
solution, (8) a party needs emotional catharsis of having a “day 
in court” that he or she might not get in traditional negotiation 
or court itself, (9) all the parties are represented by counsel, or 
(10) the parties pay their own attorney’s fees.
29
 
This data is of course very useful to parties and counsel as they 
consider their dispute resolution options. However, it is unclear 
whether and to what extent this information is applicable to 
international commercial disputes, since the research was conducted 
in other contexts.
30
  
Case studies suggest that parties and counsel involved in 
international commercial disputes may not behave in precisely the 
same manner as parties and counsel in other types of matters.
31
 For 
example, it has been said that parties in international commercial 
disputes are often unable to set aside their adversarial inclinations.
32
   
 
 29. John Lande & Rachel Wohl, Listening to Experienced Users, 13 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 
18, 19 (2007); see also Frank E.A. Sander & Lukasz Rozdieczer, Matching Cases and Dispute 
Resolution Procedures: Detailed Analysis Leading to A Mediation-Centered Approach, 11 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2006).  
 30. See Lande & Wohl, supra note 29, at 18. While some studies concerning the 
popularity of mediation in commercial contexts appear to exist, that is not precisely the same as 
studies measuring success rates. See DAVID LIPSKY & RONALD SEEBER, THE APPROPRIATE 
RESOLUTION OF CORPORATE DISPUTES: A REPORT ON THE GROWING USE OF ADR BY U.S. 
CORPORATIONS 23 (1998), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent. 
cgi?article=1003&context=icrpubs (discussing international commercial usage); David Lipsky 
& Ronald Seeber, In Search of Control: The Corporate Embrace of ADR, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & 
EMP. L. 133, 136–37 (1998); Richard W. Naimark & Stephanie E. Keer, International Private 
Commercial Arbitration: Expectations and Perceptions of Attorneys and Business People—A 
Forced Rank Analysis, 30 INT’L BUS. LAW. 203, 203–09 (2002); Stipanowich & Lamare, supra 
note 17; see also TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH (Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard Naimark eds., 2005).  
 31. See WHEELER & MORRIS, INTERNATIONAL, supra note 20, at 4. 
 32. See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 113. 
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As a result, in international commercial cases 
[w]here . . . a great deal is at stake for the parties, where the 
issues are complex, or where there is not at least a minimal 
level of trust, conciliation [or mediation] will pose much 
greater difficulties and may well come to resemble an 
adversarial proceeding, without the benefit of a binding 
decision at the end of the process.
33
  
Questions therefore arise as to whether international commercial 
disputes reflect certain unique characteristics that affect either the 
mediation process or outcome.
34
  
Interestingly, scholars and practitioners have already identified 
several ways in which international commercial mediation might be 
distinguishable from domestic mediation. The most well-known of 
these features involves the difficulties associated with mediating 
across cultural boundaries. Although cross-cultural concerns are 
certainly worthy of discussion,
35
 these issues do not seem to be 
unique to international disputes. Instead, “domestic mediators are 
increasingly likely to be involved in disputes between people who 
represent distinctly different ethnic, racial, or national origin 
cultures.”
36
 Furthermore, experienced and knowledgeable mediators 
appear entirely capable of overcoming disparities in the parties’ 
cultural backgrounds.
37
 Therefore, the cross-cultural nature of 
international commercial mediation does not seem to be either 
unanticipated or unduly problematic.  
However, there is another feature of international commercial 
disputes that has not received nearly as much attention. Experts have 
suggested that “[i]nternational commercial mediations are often more 
 
 33. Id. at 119. 
 34. See Herbert et al., supra note 16, at 111–23; Mason, supra note 3, at 64–65.  
 35. A growing number of commentators have considered these matters. See Abramson, 
supra note 4, at 325–26; John Barkai, What’s a Cross-Cultural Mediator to Do? A Low-Context 
Solution for a High-Context Problem, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 43, 52–87 (2008); 
Gaultier, supra note 5, at 50–54; WHEELER & MORRIS, INTERNATIONAL, supra note 20, at 4. 
 36. Barkai, supra note 35, at 43. 
 37. See Abramson, supra note 4, at 275; Barkai, supra note 35, at 87–89; Gaultier, supra 
note 5, at 53–54. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol45/iss1/7
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complex with more participants than their domestic counterparts,”
38
 
which raises a number of concerns, since there is a significant amount 
of debate as to whether complexity constitutes a bar or an incentive to 
mediation.
39
  
To some extent, the outcome may depend on what is meant by the 
term “complexity.” In the international context, “complexity” can 
include concerns about choice of law (including the application of 
mandatory law), cross-border regulatory issues, jurisdictional 
matters, extraterritorial application of evidentiary or other privileges, 
and enforcement of the final awards or judgments. Each of these 
factors may affect the parties’ willingness to engage in international 
commercial mediation in a slightly different manner. Although it is 
impossible to consider each of these elements in detail due to space 
limitations, it is useful to consider one key feature that is often 
overlooked—namely, the nature of the underlying contractual 
relationship between the parties.
40
 
At one point, international commercial disputes were relatively 
simple, involving only two parties and a single contract.
41
 Although 
these sorts of relationships still exist, empirical studies suggest that 
multiparty and multicontract transactions are becoming increasingly 
prevalent in the international realm.
42
 Furthermore, not all of these 
transactions are the same. For example, it is possible to distinguish 
 
 38. Mason, supra note 3, at 66; see also Brunet, supra note 27, at 53–54.  
 39. See Joseph P. Stulberg, Questions, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 531, 534 (2002); 
see also Edwards, supra note 28 at 295–97; Mark J. Heley, Mediation of Construction Cases 
Using “Blind Negotiations”: Can Providing Less Information Generate Better Results?, 34 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 273, 274 (2007); see also supra notes 29–34 and accompanying text. 
 40. See, e.g., Loukas Mistelis, International Arbitration—Corporate Attitudes and 
Practices—12 Perceptions Tested: Myths, Data and Analytical Research Report, 15 AM. REV. 
INT’L ARB. 525, 586 (2004) (citing empirical studies suggesting “[t]he need to improve the 
framework for multiparty, multicontract and multiclaim disputes”). Non-contractual claims can 
also arise in international commercial disputes, but those will likely fall within a broad pre-
dispute dispute resolution provision contained in a commercial agreement. 
 41. The continuing fascination with simple, bilateral contractual relationships explains the 
prevalent belief in “folklore” arbitration, which does not bear much resemblance to the reality 
of contemporary international commercial arbitration. See Brunet, supra note 27, at 40–41. 
 42. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration by the Numbers: The State of Empirical 
Research on International Commercial Arbitration, 22 ARB. INT’L 291, 300 (2006) (“Of the 
cases filed with the ICC in 2004, 31 percent were multiparty disputes. The average number of 
parties in a multiparty case was 5.24 (although the 10 cases with more than 10 parties—
including one with 81 respondents—no doubt pulled up the average).”).  
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between (1) single contract multiparty relationships, (2) multicontract 
multiparty relationships (which reflect a number of different 
nuances
43
) and (3) multicontract bilateral relationships.
44
  
At one time, these sorts of complex transactions were believed to 
arise primarily—if not exclusively—in construction
45
 and insurance 
law.
46
 However, similar sorts of complex contractual arrangements 
now exist in a variety of fields, including international project 
finance,
47
 capital markets,
48
 securities,
49
 energy,
50
 derivatives,
51
 and 
sovereign debt.
52
 Multifaceted contractual relationships are also 
 
 43. For example, some multiparty relationships—such as those in the construction or 
insurance/reinsurance realm—can be described in terms of a vertical string, while other 
relationships—such as those relating to a société coopérative—can be characterized as 
reflecting a hub-and-spoke arrangement. See S.I. STRONG, CLASS, MASS, AND COLLECTIVE 
ARBITRATION IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶¶ 3.34–3.36 (2013).  
 44. See BERNARD HANOTIAU, COMPLEX ARBITRATIONS: MULTIPARTY, MULTICONTRACT, 
MULTI-ISSUE AND CLASS ACTIONS 101 (2005); John Gilbert, Multi-Party and Multi-Contract 
Arbitration, in ARBITRATION IN ENGLAND WITH CHAPTERS ON SCOTLAND AND IRELAND 455, 
455–81 (Julian D.M. Lew et al. eds., 2013); Fritz Nicklisch, Multi-Party Arbitration and 
Dispute Resolution in Major Industrial Projects, 11 J. INT’L ARB. 57, 59–60, 71 (1994); Martin 
Platte, When Should an Arbitrator Join Cases?, 18 ARB. INT’L 67 nn.18–20 (2002).  
 45. See Charles Molineaux, Moving Toward a Construction Lex Mercatoria: A Lex 
Constructionis, 14 J. INT’L ARB. 55, 57 (1997); John Linarelli, Analytical Jurisprudence and 
the Concept of Commercial Law, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 119, 168–77 (2009) (discussing the 
International Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC) standard terms). 
 46. See Dennis A. Cammarano, Impacts of the Supreme Court Decision in Regal-Beloit: 
Exporting Import Litigation, 85 TUL. L. REV. 1207, 1213–14 (2011) (discussing insurance and 
reinsurance arbitration involving the Bermuda Form); Chris Harris, Liability Insurance in 
International Arbitration: The Bermuda Form, 21 ARB. INT’L 249, 249 (2005) (book review). 
 47. See Mark Kantor, Dear Corporate Partner, 21 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 1, 2 (Mar. 
2006) [hereinafter Kantor, Dear Corporate Partner]; Rachel Bowen, Note, Walking the Talk: 
The Effectiveness of Environmental Commitments Made by Multilateral Development Banks, 22 
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 731, 746 (2010).  
 48. See Jonathan R. Rod, Current Trends in Financing International Resource Projects, in 
International Resources Law: Today’s Oil, Gas and Mining Projects, 44A ROCKY MTN. MIN. 
L. SPEC. INST. III.A.2 (Mar. 1997). 
 49. See Peter B. Oh, Tracing, 80 TUL. L. REV. 849, 869–70 (2006) (discussing a series of 
interlocking brokerage contracts involving beneficial owners of securities, brokers, 
depositories, and perhaps other intermediaries). 
 50. See Dewey J. Gonsoulin, Jr., et al., Representing Clients in International Energy 
Projects, 50 HOUS. LAW. 10, 11 (2012). 
 51. See Dan Wielsch, Global Law’s Toolbox: Private Regulation by Standards, 60 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 1075, 1086–87 (2012) (discussing arbitration involving the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA) master agreement).  
 52. See Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/ 
default/files/case-documents/italaw1276.pdf (involving 90 claimants); Abaclat v. Argentine 
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common in shareholder
53
 and joint venture agreements.
54
 Indeed, 
few, if any, areas of commercial law are immune from the creep of 
contractual complexity.  
The situation is further complicated by the fact that many 
multiparty disputes arise out of what initially looks like a purely 
bilateral contract. However,  
[i]n completing an international transaction, at least five 
principal contracts or agreements need to be made, namely, the 
contract of sale ([l]egal relationships between buyer and seller 
of goods), the contract of carriage ([l]egal relationships 
between shipper and carrier of the goods), the contract of 
insurance ([a]rrangements for the insurance of those goods 
sold and carried), agreement of payment ([f]inancial 
arrangements for international transaction) and agreement of 
dispute settlement ([m]ethod for dispute resolution).
55
 
Although a dispute may initially appear to arise under only one of 
those contracts, various factual or legal issues may implicate one or 
more of the other contractual relationships.
56
 The choice then 
becomes whether to address all of the relevant concerns at a single 
time, in a single forum, or hear them separately, with the attendant 
risk of inconsistent outcomes and increased time and energy spent on 
dispute resolution processes. 
Multicontract and multiparty disputes have caused a number of 
concerns for arbitration,
57
 and some of these factors could be 
problematic for mediation as well. However, recent commentary has 
moved away from the traditional view that multiparty disputes are not 
 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Aug. 4, 
2011), http://italaw.com/documents/AbaclatDecisiononJurisdiction.pdf (involving 60,000 
claimants); STRONG, supra note 43, ¶¶ 2.121–2.142.  
 53. See T.M. Lennox, Transfer of Obligations, 2 MELB. J. INT’L L. 209, 214 (2001). 
 54. See Larry A. DiMatteo, Strategic Contracting: Contract Law as a Source of 
Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L. J. 727, 756–57 (2010); Jane Knowler & Charles 
Rickett, The Fiduciary Duties of Joint Venture Parties—When Do They Arise and What Do 
They Comprise?, 42 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 117, 119–20 (2011). 
 55. Zhen Jing, Insurer Beware!—Circumstances in Which the Insurer May Lose His 
Subrogation Rights in Marine Insurance, 43 J. MAR. L. & COM. 129, 130 n.4 (2012).  
 56. See Kantor, Dear Corporate Partner, supra note 47, at 10. 
 57. See Strong, Increasing Legalism, supra note 2, at 122–27.  
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well suited for mediation and instead takes the view that there is 
nothing about multiparty matters that cannot be resolved through 
good mediation procedures.
58
 However, caution is nevertheless 
advised, since mediators may need to adjust techniques that were 
initially developed for use in bilateral matters. For example, neutrals 
in multiparty matters may need to 
1. Spend extra time in pre-negotiation and needs assessment. 
. . .  
2. Use opening statements by participants as an opportunity 
for each person to share initial positions and be understood. . . . 
3. Actively seek common ground early, not to minimize areas 
of difference, but to clarify them. . . .  
4. Recognize that several levels of negotiation need to occur[,] 
[including] [c]ross-group discussion [relating to the] 
substantive negotiation [and] within-group communication [to 
address] psychological and procedural needs in conflict. . . .  
5. Whenever possible, have subgroups form that break down 
old coalitions. . . .  
6. Be sensitive to the tension between being (social 
cohesiveness) and doing (task effectiveness) within the group. 
. . .  
7. Be especially sensitive to the role of moderates and 
extremists within the meeting[,] [where] [m]oderates are 
defined . . . as those who demonstrate flexibility in negotiation 
[and] . . . [e]xtremists . . . are those who rigidly hold on to a 
minority position [and] . . . narrowly define the agenda and 
 
 58. A growing number of authorities discuss how a multiparty mediation might optimally 
proceed. See generally CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS—PRACTICAL 
SOLUTIONS FOR RESOLVING CONFLICTS 427–41 (2003); 2 COMPLEX DISPUTE RESOLUTION: 
MULTI-PARTY DISPUTE RESOLUTION, DEMOCRACY AND DECISION-MAKING (Carrie Menkel-
Meadow ed., 2012) [hereinafter MULTI-PARTY DISPUTE RESOLUTION]; Jeff Kichaven, A Tool 
for Multi-Party Insurance Litigation Mediation with “Additional Insureds,” IMRI (April 2008), 
http://www.irmi.com/expert/articles/2008/kichaven04.aspx; Rodney A. Max, Multiparty 
Mediation, 23 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 269 (1999).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol45/iss1/7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014]  Beyond International Commercial Arbitration? 23 
 
 
often sabotage efforts by others (even in their own camp) to 
negotiate. . . .  
8. Continue to be vigilant regarding your neutrality throughout 
the process. . . .
59
  
Multiparty mediations also give rise to a number of structural 
problems that are qualitatively different than those which exist in 
bilateral disputes.
60
 For example, the concept of Pareto-efficiency, 
which is central to the identification of a reasonable resolution of a 
bilateral dispute, is inapplicable in the multiparty context.
61
 
Conversely, multiparty disputes generate concerns about group 
decision-making dynamics that do not exist in two-party conflicts.
62
  
Multiparty negotiation and, by extension, multiparty mediation 
often face three challenges that are absent in two-party proceedings. 
First, as the number of parties increase, the likelihood that 
coalitions will emerge also increases. Coalitional behavior can 
make it difficult to reach agreement in complex problem-
solving situations as subgroups seek to form either “winning” 
or “blocking” coalitions. Second, as the number of parties at 
the table increases, the task of managing the conversation 
becomes more complicated. Coordinating a problem-solving 
 
 59. Guidelines for Mediating Multi-Party Disputes, U. WIS.–MADISON, OFF. OF HUM. 
RESOURCE DEV., https://www.ohrd.wisc.edu/home/HideATab/FullyPreparedtoManage/Conflict 
Resolution/Over view/MultiPartyDisputes/tabid/225/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2013). 
 60. See generally MULTI-PARTY DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 58; Peter Kamminga, 
Overcoming Barriers to Using Mediation in Multi-Party Disputes, EUR. ASSOC. OF JUDGES FOR 
MEDIATION (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2298874; see also INTERNATIONAL MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION: APPROACHES TO THE 
MANAGEMENT OF COMPLEXITY (I. William Zartman ed., 1994); Bruce Money & Chad Allred, 
An Exploration of a Model of Social Networks and Multilateral Negotiations, 25 NEGOT. J. 337, 
337–56 (July 2009); LEIGH L. THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR 221 
(2009), reprinted in MULTI-PARTY DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 58, at 123–38.  
 61. See Robert M. Mnookin, Strategic Barriers to Dispute Resolution: A Comparison of 
Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations, 159 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 199 (2003), 
reprinted in MULTI-PARTY DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 58, at 3, 13–22 (suggesting that 
“sufficient consensus” may be the optimal outcome in multiparty matters). 
 62. See Lawrence Susskind et al., What We Have Learned about Teaching Multiparty 
Negotiation, 21 NEGOT. J. 395 (2005), reprinted in MULTI-PARTY DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra 
note 58, at 25, 26; Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 
YALE L.J. 71 (2000), reprinted in MULTI-PARTY DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 58, at 65, 
68, 69.  
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dialogue (i.e., who gets to speak, what information is shared, 
how written summaries of what has been agreed to are 
prepared, and how those not at the table are kept informed) 
requires not just process management skill, but legitimacy in 
the eyes of all the stakeholders. Finally, as the number of 
parties increases, the analytical challenges facing the 
stakeholders—especially as they try to examine and evaluate 
offers and counteroffers—increase exponentially. 
Representatives involved in multiparty negotiation must focus 
not just on what they want or do not want, but also on the 
changing nature of “their next best option” given what others 
at the table might conclude without them.
63
 
These factors suggest that mediation of many international 
commercial disputes may never constitute the kind of quick, easy, 
and inexpensive dispute resolution process that many commercial 
actors now envision.
64
 However, that does not mean that international 
disputes are inappropriate for mediation; it may simply mean that 
parties will have to find another rationale that justifies the use of 
mediation in complex, multiparty matters.  
III. MOTIVES FOR USING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
MEDIATION 
If the complexity of the underlying contractual relationships in 
international commercial transactions reduces the likelihood of quick, 
informal, and inexpensive mediations, then the next question is 
whether there are any good reasons to choose mediation in the cross-
border business context. Initially, the prospects do not appear 
promising, at least if the analysis focuses on rationales commonly 
 
 63.  Lawrence E. Susskind & Larry Crump, Editors’ Introduction—Multiparty 
Negotiation: An Emerging Field of Study and New Specialization, in 1 MULTIPARTY 
NEGOTIATION: COMPLEX LITIGATION AND LEGAL TRANSACTIONS xxv, xxv (Lawrence E. 
Susskind & Larry Crump eds., 2008). 
 64. See David A. Hoffman, Mediation, Multiple Minds, and Managing the Negotiation 
Within, 16 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 297, 302 (2011) (suggesting that mediation of some kinds of 
complex disputes may take months, even years); see also supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
But see Gaultier, supra note 5, at 45 (suggesting that “a commercial mediation will take about 
one day,” with international matters perhaps taking two days). 
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enunciated in the bilateral context, since commentary in that field 
often emphasizes the benefits of speed, informality, and lack of 
expense.
65
 While experts in two-party mediation recognize that 
consensus-based procedures offer some additional advantages (such 
as the preservation of ongoing relationships or the creation of a 
resolution that would not be available through adjudication), those 
attributes may not be as important to parties who are primarily 
focused on savings of time and money, or who may be concerned 
about the various disadvantages of mediation.
66
  
Another means of analyzing this issue is to consider the growing 
body of literature on multiparty mediation to see whether that 
research generates some additional ideas as to why commercial 
parties would want to engage in international mediation.
67
 The 
difficulty with this approach is that most studies of multiparty 
mediation focus primarily on ethnic conflicts in the interstate context 
and community disputes involving public lands.
68
 Although these 
 
 65. See Gaultier, supra note 5, at 45–47 (discussing standard perceived benefits of 
mediation); see also id. at 49–54 (discussing the disadvantages of mediation, particularly in a 
cross-border context). The cost of mandatory “cooling off” or negotiation periods can be 
astronomical. See Mark Kantor, Negotiated Settlement of Public Infrastructure Disputes, in 
NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: IN MEMORIAM THOMAS WÄLDE 199, 
214 (Todd Weiler & Freya Baetens eds., 2011). 
 66. See Gaultier, supra note 5, at 45–54; Lande, supra note 17, at 212 (listing items of 
importance to parties and counsel). 
 67. See supra notes 58–63 and accompanying text. 
 68. See, e.g., Chester A. Crocker et al., Multiparty Mediation and the Conflict Cycle, in 
HERDING CATS: MULTIPARTY MEDIATION IN A COMPLEX WORLD 19, 33–39 (Chester A. 
Crocker et al. eds., 1999) (discussing multiparty mediation in the Balkan conflicts of the 
1990s); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, From Legal Disputes to Conflict Resolution and Human 
Problem Solving: Legal Dispute Resolution in a Multidisciplinary Context, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
7, 26 (2004); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Litigation is Not the Only Way: Consensus 
Building and Mediation as Public Interest Lawyering, in 3 MULTIPARTY NEGOTIATION: 
COMPLEX LITIGATION AND LEGAL TRANSACTIONS 56, 57–58 (Lawrence E. Susskind & Larry 
Crump eds., 2008) (discussing domestic public interest litigation); Lawrence Susskind & 
Connie Ozawa, Mediating Public Disputes: Obstacles and Possibilities, 41 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 
145 (1985), reprinted in MULTI-PARTY DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 58, at 373, 373–87; 
Michael R. Fowler, The Increasingly Complicated World of International Mediation, 18 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 977, 979–1001 (2003) (reviewing HERDING CATS: MULTIPARTY 
MEDIATION IN A COMPLEX WORLD (Chester A. Crocker et al., eds. 1999)). Although multiparty 
mediation can occur in other contexts (such as class actions or civil rights disputes), the 
literature tends not to focus on the multiparty nature of these matters. See Richard D. Fincher, 
Mediating Class Action Litigation Involving the EEOC: Insights for Employment Mediators 
and Counsel, 67 DISP. RESOL. J. 19, 37–38 (2013); Eric D. Green, Re-examining Mediator and 
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matters provide very useful information concerning how multiparty 
mediations might proceed, these types of cases are less helpful in 
describing why commercial entities should enter into mediation since 
the underlying disputes have little in common with business 
concerns.
69
 For example, ethnic conflicts and community disputes 
often involve moral, political, or religious elements that are absent 
from commercial matters.
70
 These sorts of value- or structure-based 
disputes may derive particular benefits from mediation, while 
commercial disputes may focus primarily on monetary concerns that 
are adequately addressed by adjudication.
71
  
Parties involved in ethnic and land-based disputes may also find 
certain types of mediation, such as transformative mediation, 
particularly beneficial.
72
 Although these techniques may be helpful in 
resolving some kinds of commercial disputes, parties involved in a 
business relationship may be less likely to seek out that type of 
process.  
Therefore, existing studies of multiparty mediation do not appear 
to provide any additional reasons why commercial parties would 
want to take their international disputes to mediation. However, there 
is another type of procedure to consider as potentially analogous to 
international commercial mediation, namely, international 
commercial arbitration.  
Much of the current discontent with international commercial 
arbitration is tied to the belief that the process has become too slow, 
expensive, and legalistic.
73
 However, these concerns have not caused 
 
Judicial Roles in Large, Complex Cases: Lessons from Microsoft and Other Megacases, 86 
B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1176 (2006). 
 69. Different types of disputes often generate different types of dispute resolution 
strategies. See MOORE, supra note 58, at 64–65 (discussing the “circle of conflicts,” which 
includes conflicts of interests, structure, values, relationships, and data, as well as ways to 
address each concern). 
 70. See id.; Robert Rubinson, A Theory of Access to Justice, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 89, 101 
(2004–2005). 
 71. This is not to say that purely monetary (or interest-based) conflicts cannot be 
addressed creatively through mediation. See MOORE, supra note 58, at 64–65. 
 72. See Robert J. Condlin, The Curious Case of Transformative Dispute Resolution: An 
Unfortunate Marriage of Intransigence, Exclusivity and Hype, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 621, 621 (2013). 
 73. See BORN, supra note 1, at 1746; UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 5, at 18; Brunet, 
supra note 27, at 40–47; Slate et al., supra note 10. 
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parties to abandon arbitration in favor of litigation. Instead, 
arbitration continues to be the preferred method of dispute resolution 
for parties engaged in cross-border transactions.
74
 This phenomenon 
suggests that commercial parties can be motivated by factors other 
than savings of time and money, and raises the question of whether 
those features also exist (or can be made to exist) in international 
commercial mediation. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that international commercial 
arbitration is superior to international litigation because arbitration 
(1) allows parties to tailor the procedural rules used to resolve the 
dispute, which often results in the harmonization of civil law and 
common law procedural practices; (2) offers a neutral dispute 
resolution process, since no party is subject to the potential biases of 
a national court; (3) permits parties to choose the substantive law that 
governs the dispute, which increases the predictability of the 
transaction; and (4) allows parties to select an expert decision maker 
who may have particular skills and attributes relevant to the dispute 
at hand.
75
 These features would appear equally applicable in 
international commercial mediation and thus could provide some 
motivation for parties to choose mediation.  
However, many people believe that the key benefit of 
international commercial arbitration relates to the easy enforceability 
of arbitral awards.
76
 Over the last fifty years, the international legal 
community has established a highly effective system of treaties and 
other mechanisms that promote the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards.
77
 As a result, arbitral awards are far easier to 
 
 74. See BORN, supra note 1, at 68–71.  
 75. See id. at 65–84.  
 76. See id. at 76–78.  
 77. See id. The most successful of these instruments, the United Nations Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) has been 
ratified or adhered to by 149 states parties. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter New York Convention]; Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts 
/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2012); see also Inter-American 
Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards (Montevideo 
Convention), May 14, 1979, 1439 U.N.T.S. 87; Inter-American Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration (Panama Convention), Jan. 30, 1975, O.A.S.T.S. No. 42, 14 I.L.M. 
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enforce internationally than court judgments, since there is no similar 
network of treaties relating to the enforcement of foreign 
judgments.
78
 A strong pro-enforcement policy also exists with 
respect to arbitration agreements, which are given a high degree of 
respect in many jurisdictions.
79
 
International commercial arbitration is therefore distinguishable 
from both international litigation and international mediation with 
respect to enforceability issues.
80
 Furthermore, the experience of 
international commercial arbitration suggests that mediation may be 
more attractive to parties if international mediation and settlement 
agreements are as easily enforceable as international arbitration 
agreements and awards. Once the playing field is leveled with respect 
to enforceability, then the parties would be free to choose their 
dispute resolution mechanism based solely on process considerations 
(i.e., a preference for consensual over adjudicative processes or vice 
versa).
81
 The question, therefore, is how to create an international 
legal regime that supports the enforcement of commercial mediation 
as effectively as the web of international treaties that currently 
supports commercial arbitration.  
 
336; European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Apr. 21, 1961, 484 
U.N.T.S. 349; BORN, supra note 1, at 91–109; William W. Park & Alexander A. Yanos, Treaty 
Obligations and National Law: Emerging Conflicts in International Arbitration, 58 HASTINGS 
L.J. 251, 257 (2006). Because the various conventions are relatively similar, this discussion will 
focus solely on the New York Convention. See New York Convention, supra.  
 78. See BORN, supra note 1, at 76–78; S.I. Strong, Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments in U.S. Courts: Problems and Possibilities, 33 REV. LITIG. (forthcoming 
2014) (discussing the difficulties of enforcing foreign judgments). 
 79. See, e.g., New York Convention, supra note 77, art. II; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985); JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., 
COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ¶¶ 7-61 to 7-62 (2003). 
 80. Differences are often what drive decisions. See Peter B. Rutledge, Convergence and 
Divergence in International Dispute Resolution, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 49, 50–52 (undertaking a 
law and economics analysis of party preference in international commercial dispute resolution). 
At this point, there are no international treaties concerning the enforcement of mediation 
agreements or settlement agreements arising out of a mediated dispute. Instead, such issues are 
determined by local law. See infra note 82 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, national legal 
standards regarding mediation vary widely, and the numerous gaps and inconsistencies in this 
field have led to serious concerns about the enforceability of both mediation agreements and 
settlements arising out of a mediation. See infra notes 111–12 and accompanying text.  
 81. See Rutledge, supra note 80, at 49–50.  
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IV. USING PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW TO PROMOTE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL MEDIATION  
At this point, most research and reform initiatives concerning 
mediation appear to focus on either the process of mediation itself or 
on questions of domestic law.
82
 However, if international commercial 
mediation is to achieve the same level of success as international 
commercial arbitration, then scholars and practitioners must turn their 
attention to questions of public international law.  
Some efforts have been taken in this regard, although most of the 
research to date appears to have been conducted in the context of 
disputes arising under international investment treaties.
83
 However, 
“this work is being done on an ad hoc basis and does not consider 
dispute resolution systematically.”
84
 Thus, it would likely be more 
productive if international commercial mediation were considered in 
a more orderly manner, perhaps in the context of a study framed by 
dispute systems design (DSD) theory.
85
  
 
 82. See van Ginkel, supra note 16, at 58 (noting the value of the Model Conciliation Law 
is that it “is the first real effort to put together a comprehensive conciliation act that covers 
virtually all relevant issues (a) to set minimum standards for the internal aspects of conciliation 
and (b) to regulate the aspects of conciliation that relate to contemporaneous or subsequent 
court, arbitral, or similar proceedings”). 
 83. See Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems 
Design, 92 MINN. L. REV. 161, 180 (2007); Spain, supra note 5, at 19–27; Welsh & Schneider, 
supra note 5, at 77.  
 84. Franck, supra note 83, at 181. 
 85. See id. at 177–78 (noting dispute systems design “is not a dispute resolution 
methodology itself” but instead reflects “the intentional and systematic creation of an effective, 
efficient, and fair dispute resolution process based upon the unique needs of a particular 
system”); see also NANCY H. ROGERS ET AL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES FOR 
MANAGING DISPUTES (2013). DSD theory has been used in a wide variety of situations, 
including international investment arbitration, international law, international mass claims 
processes, federalism, and the rule of law. See Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Reflections on 
Designing Governance to Produce the Rule of Law, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 67, 76–78 (2011); 
Amy J. Cohen, Dispute Systems Design, Neoliberalism, and the Problem of Scale, 14 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 51, 54–60 (2009); Franck, supra note 83, at 177–78; Francis E. McGovern, 
Dispute System Design: The United Nations Compensation Commission, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. 171, 176 (2009); Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 23, 130 (2011); 
Spain, supra note 5, at 46–47.  
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Notably, DSD does not promote a particular methodology or 
process. Instead,  
[t]he objective of DSD is to design better dispute resolution 
systems. It does so by (1) analyzing parties’ patterns of 
disputing to diagnose the current system, (2) designing 
methods to manage conflict more effectively with practical 
principles, (3) approving and implementing the design 
architecture, and (4) testing and evaluating the new design to 
make appropriate revisions prior to disseminating the process 
to the rest of the system.
86
 
Full DSD analyses are extremely rigorous and beyond the scope 
of an Article such as this.
87
 Nevertheless, it is possible to discuss 
certain constituent elements of a DSD study so as to facilitate future 
work in this field. Indeed, this Article has already provided a 
preliminary evaluation of one aspect of a DSD study; namely, 
“parties’ patterns of disputing to diagnose the current system” of 
international commercial dispute resolution.
88
 
One of the core features of a DSD analysis involves the 
identification of practical methods of “manag[ing] conflict more 
effectively” so as to create a legal architecture that is responsive to 
the needs of the relevant stakeholders.
89
 This technique may be 
particularly useful to law and policymakers seeking to understand 
how best to use public international law to help support the 
development of international commercial arbitration. In particular, 
reformers can consider whether and to what extent the techniques 
used to promote international commercial arbitration can be applied 
to international commercial mediation.  
Interestingly, there are already a number of key structural 
similarities between international commercial arbitration and 
international commercial mediation. For example, both systems are 
 
 86. Franck, supra note 83, at 178.  
 87. A full DSD analysis requires consideration of “at least eight initial variables,” 
including “function, metaphor, authority and funding, size and similarity, organization and 
implementation, eligibility criteria, damage methodology, and compensation.” McGovern, 
supra note 85, at 176. 
 88. Franck, supra note 83, at 178; see also supra notes 42–56 and accompanying text.  
 89. Franck, supra note 83, at 178.  
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the subject of a variety of detailed procedural rules adopted by both 
private institutions
90
 and quasi-public bodies such as UNCITRAL.
91
 
UNCITRAL has also promulgated various model laws concerning 
both international commercial arbitration and international 
commercial mediation, thereby helping to ensure consistent national 
treatment of both procedures.
92
 
These mechanisms have been very effective in promoting 
international commercial arbitration.
93
 However, mediation has not 
enjoyed the same level of success. While this result could be the 
result of an inherent preference for adjudicative rather than 
consensual forms of dispute resolution in this area of practice,
94
 the 
failure of international commercial mediation could also be attributed 
to the absence of any multilateral or bilateral treaties supporting the 
enforcement of mediation and settlement agreements.
95
 Indeed, this is 
 
 90. A variety of private arbitral institutions, including the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC), the American Arbitration Association (through its international arm, the 
International Center for Dispute Resolution (ICDR)), and the London Court of International 
Arbitration (LCIA), offer rules on both international commercial arbitration and international 
commercial mediation or conciliation. See Barkett, supra note 16, at 365–82.  
 91. See UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, supra note 10; see also UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules 2010, supra note 11; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 1976, supra note 11. 
 92. See Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law, G.A. Res. 57/18, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/Res/57/18, (Jan. 24, 2003) [hereinafter Model Conciliation Law]; UNCITRAL Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, 18th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. A/40/17, Annex I (June 21, 1985), revised by Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade 
Law, 39th Sess., June 17–July 7, 2006, GAOR, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/61/17, Annex I, Supp. 
No. 17 (2006) [hereinafter Model Arbitration Law]; see also BORN, supra note 1, at 115–21, 
1782–83; LEW ET AL., supra note 79, ¶¶ 2-38 to 2-41, 3-11. The UNCITRAL Model Arbitration 
Law is the more widely adopted of the two provisions, since it has been adopted in nearly 100 
states and territories in either its original or amended form, as compared to the Model 
Conciliation Law, which has only been adopted in thirteen countries and eleven U.S. states, 
plus the District of Columbia. See Status: Model Law on International Commercial 
Conciliation, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2002 
Model_conciliation_status.html; Status: Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 
UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_ 
status.html; see also UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 5; Deason, supra note 10, at 572; Gaultier, 
supra note 5, at 42–43; van Ginkel, supra note 16, at 1–65.  
 93. See BORN, supra note 1, at 91–109; LEW ET AL., supra note 79, ¶¶ 2-34 to 2-41. 
 94. See Schwartz, supra note 6, at 112–13. But see Hensler, supra note 15, at 83 
(suggesting scholarly bias against adjudicative mechanisms). 
 95. Although international commercial arbitration relies primarily on a few highly 
effective multilateral treaties, the world of international investment arbitration suggests that a 
highly integrated system of bilateral treaties could also be effective. See CAMPBELL 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 45:11 
 
 
the one area where international commercial arbitration and 
international commercial mediation differ most radically. As such, 
the next step in encouraging international commercial mediation 
would appear to involve the use of public international law to create 
one or more international treaties supporting the use of mediation in 
cross-border commercial disputes.
96
 
Questions logically arise as to what elements should be included 
in an international convention on international commercial mediation. 
Experience in the arbitral realm suggests that simplicity is key.
97
 
Therefore, drafters of any proposed treaty on international 
commercial mediation should likely limit themselves to two basic 
elements that are also reflected in the key conventions on 
international commercial arbitration: enforcement of the agreement to 
engage in a particular type of dispute resolution process and 
enforcement of the end product of the dispute resolution process.
98
 
A. Enforcement of a Mediation Agreement 
First, any convention on international commercial mediation 
should address the enforceability of an agreement to mediate.
99
 The 
content of this duty likely can be described relatively simply, 
although it would be useful to consider what constitutes rejection or 
termination of mediation, since there is a considerable amount of 
 
MCLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 
¶ 1.08 (2007) (describing the field of international investment arbitration as a “patchwork quilt 
of interlocking but separate bilateral treaties”); José E. Alvarez, A BIT on Custom, 2 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 17, 17 (2012); see also supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 96. Interestingly, some proponents of mediation caution against increased standardization, 
based on fears that the process may become too popular too soon. See Lande, supra note 17, at 
226–27. However, the experience in international commercial arbitration suggests that 
procedural diversity can be retained, despite the standardization of enforcement mechanisms. 
See LEW ET AL., supra note 79, ¶¶ 3-9, 3-18.  
 97. See New York Convention, supra note 77; BORN, supra note 1, at 95–96; ALBERT JAN 
VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 1958: TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL 
INTERPRETATION 9–10 (1981).  
 98. See BORN, supra note 1, at 95–96; VAN DEN BERG, supra note 97, at 9–10.  
 99. This feature correlates to provisions in conventions on international commercial 
arbitration concerning the enforcement of arbitration agreements. See New York Convention, 
supra note 77, art. II. 
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debate about that particular issue, especially in the context of 
multitiered (step) dispute resolution clauses.
100
  
Notably, it may not be necessary for the international community 
to identify entirely new language concerning the enforcement of an 
agreement to mediate, since experience in the arbitral realm suggests 
that the system works better if national and international law are 
consistent.
101
 Drafters could therefore turn to the Model Conciliation 
Law for inspiration, since that instrument includes some very good 
language concerning the enforcement of an agreement to mediate as 
well as provisions relating to the rejection or termination of an offer 
to mediate.
102
  
For example, Article 4(2) of the Model Conciliation Law indicates 
that 
[i]f a party that invited another party to conciliate does not 
receive an acceptance of the invitation within thirty days from 
the day on which the invitation was sent, or within such other 
period of time as specified in the invitation, the party may elect 
to treat this as a rejection of the invitation to conciliate.
103
 
The identification of a firm deadline creates a useful default 
mechanism and ensures that a recalcitrant party does not hold the 
other party hostage to a particular process.  
 
 100. See BORN, supra note 1, at 841–49 (discussing whether mediation is a condition 
precedent (precondition) to arbitration). 
 101. Increased consistency leads to increased predictability. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra 
note 5, at 13; see also Model Arbitration Law, supra note 92, Explanatory Note to 1985 
version, ¶ 47 (noting the text of the New York Convention and the Model Arbitration Law were 
meant to mirror one another); BORN, supra note 1, at 115–21; William W. Park, The Specificity 
of International Arbitration: The Case for FAA Reform, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1241, 
1243 (2003). 
 102. See Model Conciliation Law, supra note 92, arts. 4(2), 11, 13; UNCITRAL GUIDE, 
supra note 5, at 29–31, 48–49, 53–54. Although the Model Conciliation Law has helped 
harmonize national treatment of this issue to a certain degree, the model language has not been 
widely adopted and there is still a great deal of diversity regarding whether and to what extent a 
mediation agreement can be enforced. See Model Conciliation Law, supra note 92; 
UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 5, at 14–15, 17; see also supra note 92. 
 103. Model Conciliation Law, supra note 92, art. 4(2). 
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Article 11 addresses potential problems that might arise after 
mediation proceedings are formally initiated. This provision states 
that 
[t]he conciliation proceedings are terminated: 
 (a) By the conclusion of a settlement agreement by the 
parties, on the date of the agreement; 
 (b) By a declaration of the conciliator, after consultation 
with the parties, to the effect that further efforts at conciliation 
are no longer justified, on the date of the declaration; 
 (c) By a declaration of the parties addressed to the 
conciliator to the effect that the conciliation proceedings are 
terminated, on the date of the declaration; or 
 (d) By a declaration of a party to the other party or parties 
and the conciliator, if appointed, to the effect that the 
conciliation proceedings are terminated, on the date of the 
declaration.
104
 
Article 13 of the Model Conciliation Law specifically addresses 
what is the most problematic situation for many parties, namely, a 
multitiered dispute resolution clause. This provision indicates that 
[w]here the parties have agreed to conciliate and have 
expressly undertaken not to initiate during a specified period of 
time or until a specified event has occurred arbitral or judicial 
proceedings with respect to an existing or future dispute, such 
an undertaking shall be given effect by the arbitral tribunal or 
the court until the terms of the undertaking have been complied 
with, except to the extent necessary for a party, in its opinion, 
to preserve its rights. Initiation of such proceedings is not of 
itself to be regarded as a waiver of the agreement to conciliate 
or as a termination of the conciliation proceedings.
105
  
 
 104. Id. art. 11. 
 105. Id. art. 13. 
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B. Enforcement of a Settlement Agreement 
Second, any new convention on international commercial 
mediation should address the enforceability of a settlement agreement 
that arises out of a mediation.
106
 Some people may believe that 
enforcement of settlement agreements should not be a primary 
concern in an international instrument of this type, since mediation is 
a consensual dispute resolution mechanism that would likely lead to 
the parties’ living up to their agreements voluntarily. However, 
parties do in fact fail to live up to their agreed obligations, which 
suggests that enforcement mechanisms are needed.
107
 Numerous 
authorities suggest that parties should include a dispute resolution 
provision in their settlement agreements as a matter of best 
practices,
108
 since post-settlement disputes appear to be on the rise, at 
least in some sectors.
109
 
The desire for a legally protected right to enforce a settlement 
agreement may be particularly high in the commercial context, since 
businesses often worry about worst-case scenarios, however unlikely, 
and want legal assurances as opposed to merely precatory language. 
Indeed, the existence of a legal right to enforcement has been found 
to be necessary (or at least useful) to the spread of international 
commercial arbitration, even though international arbitration has a 
very high voluntary compliance rate.
110
  
 
 106. This feature correlates to provisions in conventions on international commercial 
arbitration concerning the enforcement of arbitral award. See New York Convention, supra note 
77, art. V. 
 107. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 376–77 (1994); 
Margaret Graham Tebo, A Learning Experience, 5 No. 27 ABA J. E-Report 2 (July 7, 2006) 
(discussing case where the American Bar Association (ABA) failed to live up to the terms of a 
consent decree). 
 108. See Court Rules, 255 F.R.D. 215, 276 (2009); Daniel Beebe, Settlement Agreements 
101—Practice Tips for Every Lawyer, 53 ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 30, 34 (Oct. 2011).  
 109. See Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 600 (2005) 
(speaking in the context of class actions); Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing Rights Created in 
Court-Connected Mediation—Tension Between the Aspirations of a Private Facilitative 
Process and the Reality of Public Adversarial Justice, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 509, 
512–13 (2004) (discussing court-annexed mediation).  
 110. See NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION ¶ 11.02 (2009); Michael Kerr, Concord and Conflict in International Arbitration, 
13 ARB. INT’L 121, 128 n.24 (1997). 
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The need for convention language relating to the enforcement of 
settlement agreements is particularly acute, given the amount of 
controversy surrounding the question of whether and to what extent 
settlement agreements are currently enforceable in the international 
realm. For example, some authorities have suggested that settlement 
agreements are enforceable under conventions relating to 
international commercial arbitration.
111
 However, there are a 
significant number of concerns about that interpretation of the 
various treaties, particularly in cases where the parties do not have a 
pre-existing arbitration agreement or where mediation is a 
precondition to arbitration.
112
  
In terms of content, the best practice again may be to have 
international standards mirror national standards so as to follow the 
example of international commercial arbitration.
113
 Some relevant 
language exists in the Model Conciliation Law, and drafters could 
consider adopting that provision so as to guarantee a certain degree of 
consistency between national and international law.
114
 However, the 
language is relatively sparse and simply states that  
[i]f the parties conclude an agreement settling a dispute, that 
settlement agreement is binding and enforceable . . . [the 
enacting State may insert a description of the method of 
 
 111. See Gaultier, supra note 5, at 48; Christopher Newmark & Richard Hill, Can A 
Mediated Settlement become an Enforceable Arbitration Award?, 16 ARB. INT’L 81, 81–87 
(2000); Brette L. Steele, Comment, Enforcing International Commercial Mediation Agreements 
as Arbitral Awards under the New York Convention, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1385, 1391–92 (2007).  
 112. See Newmark & Hill, supra note 111, at 81–87 (noting that although numerous 
arbitral rules and arbitration laws permit the entry of a consent award in situations where the 
parties settle their dispute during the pendency of an arbitration, there still needs to be an 
arbitration before those rules and laws apply).  
 113. See New York Convention, supra note 77; Model Arbitration Law, supra note 92; 
LEW ET AL., supra note 79, ¶ 2-40. Numerous problems have arisen in the United States 
because the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not mirror international standards. See Park, 
supra note 101, at 1242–43; S.I. Strong, Beyond the Self-Execution Analysis: Rationalizing 
Constitutional, Treaty and Statutory Interpretation in International Commercial Arbitration, 53 
VA. J. INT’L L. 499, 527–39 (2013). 
 114. See Model Conciliation Law, supra note 92, art. 14; see also UNCITRAL GUIDE, 
supra note 5, at 55–58. 
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enforcing settlement agreements or refer to provisions 
governing such enforcement].
115
 
This provision is potentially problematic because it gives 
enforcing courts no real guidance as to what procedural or 
substantive standards should apply to the enforcement of settlement 
agreements. Although conventions on international commercial 
arbitration allow for some variation in enforcement procedures based 
on local practice, those instruments nevertheless provide national 
courts with a useful practical standard of behavior by identifying an 
exclusive list of the grounds upon which an arbitral award may be 
denied recognition and enforcement.
116
 The international legal 
community may need to identify similar standards in the mediation 
context so as to provide commercial parties with the type of 
consistency that they desire. 
When debating this issue, drafters may wish to consider some 
potentially useful language from the European Union’s 2008 
directive concerning mediation in cross-border disputes.
117
 Article 
6(1) of that instrument states that 
Member States shall ensure that it is possible for the parties, or 
for one of them with the explicit consent of the others, to 
request that the content of a written agreement resulting from 
mediation be made enforceable. The content of such an 
agreement shall be made enforceable unless, in the case in 
question, either the content of that agreement is contrary to the 
law of the Member State where the request is made or the law 
of that Member State does not provide for its enforceability.
118
 
Although this provision provides a starting point for further 
analysis, the language is relatively weak and subject to variations 
 
 115. Model Conciliation Law, supra note 92, art. 14. 
 116. See New York Convention, supra note 77, arts. III, VII(1), V; S.I. Strong, What 
Constitutes an “Agreement in Writing” in International Commercial Arbitration? Conflicts 
between the New York Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act, 48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 47, 
74–78 (2012) (discussing the “more favorable national law” provision). 
 117. See European Parliament and the Council of 21 May 2008 on Certain Aspects of 
Mediation in Civil and Commercial Matters Directive 2008/52/EC, 2008 O.J. (L 136) 3. 
 118. Id. art. 6(1). 
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based on national law. Therefore, this may be an area where drafters 
will be required to create new standards from scratch.  
V. CONCLUSION  
Interest in international commercial mediation appears to be 
growing, both in the United States and elsewhere. However, it is 
unclear whether potential participants have taken the differences 
between domestic and international commercial disputes fully into 
account. Some features, such as the size and complexity of cross-
border business matters, are particularly important to consider 
because they may negate the supposition that mediation can reduce 
the time, cost, and formality associated with the resolution of 
international commercial disputes. 
If international commercial actors are only concerned about 
saving time, cost, and complexity, then international commercial 
mediation may never become as popular as proponents may hope, 
since mediation does not appear to be superior to arbitration in these 
regards. However, there may be other reasons why multinational 
businesses would want to engage in mediation.  
This Article has suggested that businesses may be more likely to 
choose international commercial mediation over international 
commercial arbitration and litigation if mediation agreements and 
settlement agreements were as easily enforceable as arbitration 
agreements and arbitral awards. If this hypothesis is correct, then it 
may be necessary to adopt an international enforcement regime 
similar to that which applies in international arbitration.  
This Article has made a few suggestions regarding how an 
international treaty on commercial mediation might be shaped. These 
recommendations are very preliminary, and experts in both public 
international law and mediation will doubtless need to make 
numerous adjustments as any future instrument is drafted.
119
 
 
 119. For example, drafters would need to find a way to protect various principles of 
procedural justice, so as to avoid abusive mediation settlements. See Rebecca Hollander-
Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Rule of Law: Fostering Legitimacy in 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 15–16; Nolan-Haley, Mediation, supra 
note 3, at 70 n.52; Welsh & Schneider, supra note 5, at 84 (discussing whether the International 
Bar Association (IBA) Rules for Investor-State Mediation adequately protect procedural 
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However, this discussion has focused primarily on whether and to 
what extent it is even necessary to adopt an international agreement 
in this area of law, so hopefully any shortcomings regarding content-
based analyses will be forgiven.  
When considering how public international law can and should 
interact with mediation, it is perhaps interesting to note certain 
differences between the way recommendations for international 
involvement arose in mediation versus arbitration. In arbitration, the 
catalyst for a multilateral treaty arose out of a desire to obtain easy 
recognition and enforcement of the end product of the proceeding 
(i.e., the award).
120
 Enforcement of elements arising at an earlier 
stage of the parties’ relationship (i.e., the arbitration agreement) was 
only considered necessary as a means of fostering a legal 
environment that could and would generate enforceable arbitral 
awards.
121
  
In mediation, temporal concerns are reversed. Parties involved in 
mediation are more concerned with enforcing the initial agreement 
(i.e., the mediation agreement) than they are with the end product 
(i.e., the settlement agreement). This emphasis on the early stage of 
the parties’ relationship may arise because of a presumption that a 
consensual form of dispute resolution will result in voluntary 
compliance with the agreed outcome. However, the lessons of 
arbitration should not be forgotten, and those involved in drafting any 
future convention on international commercial mediation should 
recognize that the ability to create a legal environment that enforces 
one aspect of the parties’ relationship (in this case, the mediation 
agreement) may require equal attention to be paid to what might 
otherwise be seen as an ancillary matter (in this case, the settlement 
agreement).
122
 
 
justice). This goal is achieved in the context of international commercial arbitration by allowing 
objections to enforcement based on various core procedural issues, and it may be that a similar 
mechanism could be devised for settlement agreements arising out of a mediated dispute. See 
New York Convention, supra note 77, art. V. 
 120. See Leonard V. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 
1049, 1059, 1063 (1961). 
 121. See BORN, supra note 1, at 95, 97. 
 122. See Quigley, supra note 120, at 1063. 
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